Scenario type 1: A continuation of the status quo

The first scenario type, which is the most likely in the short to medium term, given various current trends and no unexpected developments, is a continuation of the strategic partnership, whereby Russia increasingly becomes a supporting partner to China in its global struggle against the West.

What would it entail?

In this scenario, the Russian-Chinese relationship steadily and moderately improves in various spheres – economic, political, diplomatic, military and defence-industrial technology – but many limitations and challenges remain, placing constraints on the growth of the relationship and what the partners can realistically gain from each other. China continues to carefully balance support to Russia with maintaining functional relations with the West. Therefore, China keeps the Russian economy afloat and boosts Russian war efforts through imports of gas and oil, and exports of various products, which include vital technology and dual-use products.

There may be stronger mutual efforts to boost yuan-ruble payments and trade as well as a faster “yuanization” of the Russian economy. Moreover, Russian and Chinese efforts to build an alternative financial and payment ecosystem outside of US dollar hegemony could be strengthened.

In this scenario China, however, does not provide significant direct military support such as weapons or ammunition. While military exercises and joint defence technology cooperation increase, there is no formal military alliance. In the event of a Chinese war against Taiwan, Russia’s support does not extend beyond political, diplomatic and inconsequential material backing.

In the information sphere, Russia and China could continue to more closely align and coordinate their efforts and narratives. A recent indicator is the various cooperation agreements between state media actors struck during Putin’s visit to Beijing in May. This also includes closer diplomatic cooperation and outreach in multilateral forums, with the Global South and within the BRICS and the SCO. China’s efforts to hamper western and Ukrainian peace efforts in favour of its own pro-Russian stance are a recent example.

Finally, it is also possible to envisage a strengthening of the current trend for the two societies to become increasingly connected not only in the political, economic and military spheres, but also culturally and societally, in fields such as education, science, tourism, language, exchanges and other people-to-people contacts. This is especially relevant with regard to Russia’s ongoing transformation from a western socio-cultural orientation. According to polls, the attitude of ordinary Russians towards China is becoming increasingly warm. Importantly, Russian universities have special expertise in subjects such as maths and theoretical physics that would be valuable for China.

How would this come about?

This type of scenario builds on several likely but not guaranteed premises: that Chinese-western relations will continue to be difficult but manageable with no clear breaks; that the West does not make it too difficult or costly for China to support Russia; that the current Russian regime and internal political system remain relatively stable; and that Russia does not become too toxic or burdensome for China. While the continuation of these premises seems probable, especially in the short term, they should not be taken for granted in the medium to long term, given the many limitations and challenges.

In the European theatre, a Europe divided, indecisive and misaligned with the US on China would be likely to contribute to this scenario, as it would make it easier for Beijing to continue its balancing act between Moscow and the West. As various individual European countries pursue their own paths in relations with China, prioritizing national interests, as actors like Hungary, Slovakia and Serbia play spoiler and sabotaging roles, and as China continues to exploit internal divisions, Beijing can continue to count on schisms in China policy within both Europe and the Transatlantic alliance in at least the short term.

An unresolved Russian war against Ukraine, which seems probable in the short to medium term, is also conducive to this scenario, as a clearer outcome in either direction could lead to the other two scenarios.

In the Indo-Pacific theatre, this scenario would probably build on the absence of a dramatic geopolitical or military regional escalation dragging China into confrontation with the United States, as well as on continued relatively functional economic and political relations between Washington and Beijing. Also relevant for this scenario is a continuation of current trends with regard to various regional bilateral and multilateral ties, including that anti-Chinese groupings do not push a desperate Beijing too far.

What would be the consequences for Russia and China?

For Russia, the consequences would be continued Chinese political, economic and material support, helping to prevent Russia from becoming completely isolated on the global stage, keeping its economy alive and sustaining its defence-industrial war machine. However, this would also mean increasing dependence on China, potentially leading to demands from Beijing that might compromise Russian interests.

For China, this scenario would mean a continuation of the tricky navigation between not allowing Russia to fail and not alienating the West or pushing Europe too far towards the hawkish direction of the United States. This allows Beijing to imperfectly but semi-plausibly achieve its dual goals of preserving its junior strategic partner Russia and not consolidating a hard anti-Chinese western alliance. Thus, if the status quo continues, and Beijing is not forced to choose one side over the other, this would be a fairly comfortable and positive development for China.

However, if the West starts to put serious pressure on China to distance itself from Russia, then these dual Chinese goals become increasingly mutually incompatible, and Beijing’s balancing act much harder, potentially forcing China to make difficult choices between only bad options.

What would it mean for western policy?

For the West, this would mean a much higher likelihood that Russia, propped up by China, will be able to continue its war on Ukraine for many years, thereby threatening European security, stability and prosperity, Transatlantic unity and western global credibility.

It would also mean that the West would have to continue its difficult, unending assessments of whether or how much China is enabling Russian war efforts, whether and how to stop this and, particularly for the EU, how to weigh this against upholding economic relations with China – a mirror dilemma to China’s. On the global stage, it could risk weakening the liberal world order and strengthening the global autocratic axis to the detriment of western interests.

A continued strategic alignment between Russia and China will also require a western ability to deter and counter both simultaneously, in both the European and the Indo-Pacific theatres, and beyond. Just as Russia and China learn from each other in their confrontations with the West, so too must the West draw lessons on the synergies between their malicious behaviour across domains.

What speaks for or against it?

Many current trends point towards this scenario in at least the short term. Russian-Chinese relations have been developing not just for the two years since the start of the war, but for several decades. While there are different views on how strong the relation’s foundations really are, or whether this is partly a “marriage of convenience”, many factors keep the two nations together beyond an immediate, opportunistic and temporary alignment of interests. These include deeper economic and political ties, increasing cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts, and a common understanding and view between the two regimes (and especially the two presidents) on areas such as indivisible security, mutual spheres of interest where foreign powers may not interfere and the threat to regime stability and political-system viability that democracy, human rights and the liberal world order pose. The strategic alignment against the West thus in many ways runs deep and is unlikely to change soon.

However, in the medium to long term, several structural, albeit more uncertain, trends are emerging or solidifying that speak against this scenario type. Economic ties, which have skyrocketed since 2022, are now limited by existing infrastructure and political will, and are unlikely to grow any further. This is reflected in the level of bilateral trade in the first seven months of 2024, which only grew by 2 % compared to the same period in 2023. In the military sphere, China will become less and less dependent on Russian technology and arms. The two countries’ strategic coordination globally, which has improved on some issues, mainly related to criticism of the West, behaviour in multilateral forums and outreach to the Global South, seems unlikely to become further aligned on many other issues and regions, notably the Arctic, Central Asia, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East.

Scenario type 2: A worsening of relations

A second scenario type is a deterioration in Russia-China relations. In this scenario, which is less likely in the short term but more likely in the long term, cooperation stagnates and decreases in various areas due to the increasing importance of the many negative factors relative to the positive.

What would it entail?

There are several variants of this scenario, depending on how bad things get between the two partners, but the overarching theme is a clear negative break from current trends. Politically, it could mean fewer high-level visits and exchanges, and China more clearly distancing itself from Russia in its diplomacy and rhetoric. This could also entail China overtly or covertly pushing back against Russia on for example Ukraine, nuclear sabre-rattling or North Korea; or China starting to diplomatically support Ukraine, its peace formula and a long-term war outcome that ensures Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, instead of China’s current pro-Russian “neutrality” which emphasizes the “legitimate security interests” of all.

Economically, this scenario could mean China decreasing its support for Russia’s economy and war efforts by buying less Russian oil and gas and abandoning joint energy infrastructure plans such as Power of Siberia 2; exporting fewer products, including military and dual-use components, to Russia; investing less in Russia; and generally doing more to avoid violating western sanctions. China could also in this scenario more bluntly start to exploit Russia’s various dependencies on China to extract more concessions without concern for Russian sensitivities.

Militarily, it could mean fewer joint exercises and stagnating military-technological and defence-industrial cooperation. Wary of each other, in this scenario the countries would not share any of the respective sensitive military technologies that the other needs for their modernization, particularly Russia.

Socially and culturally, in this scenario type, the two countries and their populations and societies would begin to drift apart rather than grow closer. In Russia, this could manifest as popular displeasure with the country’s humiliating dependence or junior status relative to China, and in particular anger at an increased Chinese presence and activities in Russia’s Far East. In China, it could be reflected in the population’s unwillingness to sacrifice ties with and opportunities in the West for a sub-par northern substitute.

How would it come about?

As shown above, the relationship has many limits, challenges and sources of tension, and many imaginable combinations of these could lead to this type of scenario. Furthermore, there are also many reasons why China might start to consider Russia’s toxicity too costly for Beijing’s multiple goals of upholding its vital economic relations with the West, promoting its global status and maintaining its ability to freely navigate complex strategic relations with the United States. Among such reasons are Russian behaviour in Ukraine or the Korean Peninsula, nuclear rhetoric or even action and, relatedly, Russia’s growing pariah status in many parts of the world. Another would be increased western secondary sanctions pressure on third countries such as China.

Furthermore, it is possible to imagine possible serious internal problems emerging in both countries that would indirectly affect the relations. If Russia, for structural or technological reasons, could no longer extract or export energy, its value for China would diminish. If Russia’s elite starts to be seriously concerned about the country’s loss of strategic autonomy, this could dampen Moscow’s enthusiasm for further boosting relations. If China’s many and serious economic problems aggravate or lead to a major crisis, it is likely that this would significantly negatively affect both Russia and their economic relations, given Russia’s economic dependence.

Another potential aspect is changes in the leadership of the two countries. While strong bilateral relations extend far beyond the two presidents, the importance of the personal connection between Putin and Xi should not be underestimated, given its longevity, the level of trust and the frequency of interactions, as well as their individual power over their respective regimes. A sudden replacement of either leader – which is unlikely but not impossible, especially in the long term given their ages – could lead to abrupt changes, most likely for the worse for bilateral ties.

In the European theatre, this scenario type could build on a Europe that is more unified, resolute and aligned with the United States on how to counter Beijing. The more pressure Europe puts on China to not support Russia, the less European countries will allow themselves to be instrumentalized by Beijing’s divisive approach. In addition, the stronger the Transatlantic alliance, the less likely it will be that Beijing will be willing or able to continue to support Moscow. On the other hand, a Europe that is completely aligned with the hawkish US stance on China might produce the opposite effect if China feels pushed into the arms of Russia.

Negative progress of the war for Moscow is another reason for why Russia could become too much of a burden for China. Russian military setbacks and potential ultimate defeat could lead to a weaker and more isolated Russia on the global stage, less capable of assisting China to counter western interests and power projection. While Beijing would probably still be interested in its natural resources and geography, its military technology and its markets, such a Russia would be a less valuable strategic partner for China and therefore less worth risking relations with the West for.

At the same time, while a far from certain consequence, if a negative war outcome for Russia leads to internal instability, unpredictability and even regime change or collapse, this could be an extremely negative development for China. In such a scenario, Beijing might lose its main strategic partner and be forced to have to deal with severe instability across much of China’s northern, and potentially also western, borders, especially if the chaos spreads south to Central Asia. China would want to avoid this nightmare at all costs. This could therefore lead to far more immediate Chinese support for the Russian regime to avoid such a development, with the potential to rapidly draw the two regimes closer together.

In the Indo-Pacific theatre, several potential developments could contribute to the manifestation of this scenario. A serious challenge to relations would be Moscow-fuelled North Korean aggression against South Korea or escalation on the Korean peninsula, which runs counter to Beijing’s desire for stability in its neighbourhood. A less serious challenge would be Russia continuing to build ties with India.

If relations improve or at least stabilize between China and the West in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with the United States, and both sides manage to navigate and accommodate each other’s interests and concerns, there might be less need and fewer incentives for China to turn to Russia, as well as better chances for the West to pressure Beijing to distance itself from Moscow.

What would be the consequences for Russia and China?

For Russia, being deprived of support from its main backer and strategic partner would mean further global isolation with potentially severe consequences in many areas. Economically, fewer Chinese exports and less income from energy exports would threaten the stability and viability of Russia’s economy, state budget and markets. Militarily, Russia’s defence industry, which depends on Chinese export and components, would be weakened, hampering Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine as well as its long-term military capabilities. Politically, losing Chinese support could weaken Russia’s global position and opportunities, making it more toxic for other partners such as the BRICS, Turkey and Central Asia, among others, damaging Russian interests and its ability to exert influence.

For China, the consequences would include the potential loss of its main strategic partner in its long-term rivalry with the United States. Deteriorating relations with Russia would be likely to have negative economic, political and military impacts on China, as it would have less access to cheap energy, receive less Russian support for its global geopolitical ambitions, and have less access to the Arctic, and to the few technological and military-technological areas where Russia still has an edge, such as civilian nuclear energy and space. It could also mean having to worry more about its 4,209-km long border with its northern neighbour, potentially diverting attention and resources it would rather spend elsewhere. Losing its closest and most powerful partner would thus hamper Beijing’s long-term goal of overtaking Washington as the leading global superpower.

However, China ceasing or limiting its support for Russia, and thus mitigating many western concerns, could also promote the stabilization of fraught US-China relations and reduce European aversion to China, potentially opening up more space for China to navigate, manage and influence western de-coupling and de-risking strategies. On the other hand, given the numerous other grounds for strategic competition and rivalry between China and especially the United States beyond the issue of Russia, Beijing might conclude, with good reason, that the trajectory of the US-China relations would not change considerably either way.

What would it mean for western policy?

For the West, this would arguably be the best of the three scenarios, as less Chinese support for Russia’s economy and war effort would make a Ukrainian victory in the war much more likely. European and Transatlantic security, prosperity, influence and resolve would all be boosted, including in other global regions. Moreover, reduced Russian-Chinese cooperation and alignment in the international arena, as well as a reduced ability to coordinate and provoke anti-western sentiments, would weaken the autocratic bloc in the global battle for the world order.

However, this scenario might pose a different long-term challenge for the West. If China were no longer bogged down by having to support an increasingly toxic, unstable and isolated Russia, it might be freer to manoeuvre and navigate its relations with the West and other global actors. Such a scenario might engender even more disunity and friction in the West on how to handle long-term trade and political relations with China. The EU would be less concerned about its immediate security and more inclined to maintain prosperous economic relations with China, while the United States might focus more resources on handling the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific and expect European backing in this theatre after all the military support the United States has provided to counter the Russian threat in Europe.

What speaks for or against it?

Despite numerous limits and challenges, many of the deeper foundations of the relationship between Russia and China seem strong and enduring, which makes this type of scenario less likely in the short term. However, some growing tendencies point in the opposite direction in the medium term and especially in the long term. The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine and European security drags on, and the clearer it becomes that China is providing systematic, decisive support for Russia’s military industry and war effort, the stronger the western political will to increase pressure on China to change its behaviour.

Thus, the stark December 2023 warning from the Biden administration to third countries enabling Russian sanctions evasion, and the increasing number of Chinese entities sanctioned and export blacklisted by the United States, has been followed by an increasing number of reports about major Chinese major banks’ reluctance or ceasing to serve Russian customers due to fear of secondary sanctions and major problems with payments between the countries. Importantly, in early 2024, Chinese exports to Russia – which increased by 47 percent in 2023 compared to 2022 and reached a record high in December 2023 – started to drop significantly. In March, April, May and July 2024, for the first time since mid-2022, Chinese exports to Russia were lower compared to the same months in the previous year. At the same time, however, this has led to an increase in financial transactions through both smaller regional Chinese banks and various murky middlemen.

Arguably, the most reasonable interpretation is that China is reacting to western pressure by pausing its economic relations with Russia, suggesting that further similar western action could influence Chinese behaviour in this regard. Whether this will affect the other realms of the relationship – strategic, political or military – or the overall direction remains open to question.

Scenario type 3: A significant strengthening of relations

The third scenario type, and arguably the least likely, entails a significantly improved relationship compared to the current situation. This could involve a closely aligned political-strategic or full-blown military alliance, or an uninhibited trading relationship.

What would it entail?

Politically, it could mean much tighter political and strategic coordination between the two countries on various issues and in various regions. In this scenario, China abandons the difficult balancing act between its increasingly incompatible goals of supporting Russia and maintaining functioning relations with the West, and is thus free to support Russia without concern for a western backlash. Their joint strategic posturing in both the North Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, against Europe, the United States, Taiwan, Japan and others, could be decisively strengthened. Government meetings and coordination at all levels could increase, allowing stronger cooperation in a wide range of areas.

Economically, apart from stronger trade and economic relations in general, this could have several implications. Chinese state and private actors might openly and systematically violate sanctions against Russia, perhaps because they no longer fear the consequences if a China-West all-out trade war is already a reality. China might become less concerned about dependency on Russia due to its fewer options, leading to serious investment in energy infrastructure to enable increased Russian energy exports, such as the long-awaited Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline.

Militarily, this scenario type could mean several things. One possibility is direct support for each other’s wars. China could provide overt, systematic and extensive direct military assistance to Russia such as weapon systems, ammunition, equipment and technology. Conversely, it is also possible to envisage direct Russian military support for Chinese ambitions concerning Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. Another involves increased cooperation on interoperability and joint exercises, involving enhancements in their frequency, complexity and geographical scope, including in strategically sensitive regions such as the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, the South China Sea or the Arctic, and potentially involving third countries such as Iran and North Korea.

A third military aspect entails decisively strengthened cooperation on military-technological and defence-industrial endeavours. This might include collaboration on satellite navigation systems and data exchange, the space and counterspace domains, and joint integration of missile defences. In such a scenario, Russia might increase its sharing and transfer of more advanced technologies in the few areas where it still has an edge, such as air defence, anti-ship and submarine capabilities, fighter jets and early warning systems. In addition, this could lead to further cooperation on emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and biotech.

The most far-reaching and least likely version of this military development scenario would involve a formal military alliance between the two countries. Beyond a legal obligation to risk their own security and troops for the sake of the other, this could entail various concrete functional alliance practices such as coordinated military procedures, joint command, interoperability, and so on.

In the cultural and societal sphere, like the first scenario but with a qualitatively more pronounced effect, there could be a significant acceleration in the growth of connections, and especially a more one-sided boost to Chinese soft power and “sinification” in Russia. Russia could become an especially attractive, cheap and available tourist, student and science destination for the Chinese middle class, given that it would still be a more open society than China’s, and that the West, in this scenario, would be far more closed to China.

In the information and cyber landscapes, Russia and China could in this scenario not only coordinate and bolster each other’s narratives in the global information war against the West, but also directly cooperate through joint open or clandestine strategic media disinformation campaigns, influence operations and other hybrid spheres. This would present a much stronger united front and threat to the West.

How would it come about?

As demonstrated above, several inhibiting factors limit the extent to which relations could be significantly strengthened. Mitigation of these factors could lead to this scenario.

A similar positive effect on Russia-China relations could occur if other limitations diminish, such as mutual distrust, regional rivalry or partial misalignment (e.g., in the Arctic, Central Asia or the Korean Peninsula), Russian fears of the power imbalance, and the increasingly different long-term prospects, aims and strategies of the two countries. However, a significant mitigation of many of these seems highly unlikely without regime or leadership changes in the countries, given that distrust and misalignment will continue to be intrinsic to the relationship, as it has been since the very beginning.

An especially important set of factors that could contribute to scenarios of stronger Russia-China relations is related to diminished European and Transatlantic resolve, unity and action vis-à-vis Beijing. The less unified, coherent and coordinated the western pressure put on China, the more Beijing will be emboldened to cross western red lines on supporting Moscow. European and Transatlantic disunity, and internal conflicts on how to deal with China in the short term and engage with it in the long term, could lead to bolstered ties between Moscow and Beijing. European countries and leaders promoting bilateral ties with China and independent policy approaches to Beijing are significant examples of such a development.

In the European theatre, another factor that could lead to strengthened relations is a decisive development or outcome in Russia’s favour in its war against Ukraine – such as the West abandoning Kyiv, a collapse of Ukraine’s defences and/or a breakthrough for Russia or some sort of pro-Russian ceasefire or peace deal. This could lead to Russia being less of a burden for China, making Beijing’s balancing act easier and opening up room for closer ties with Moscow.

In the Indo-Pacific theatre, several factors are of potential importance for this scenario. How the regional alliances and balance develop will be important, as stronger anti-China groupings might incentivize Beijing to seek closer cooperation with Moscow, while closer ties between Russia and North Korea or India might have the opposite effect.

A crucial factor is the continued Chinese interest in working relations with the West. If the current tension, rivalry and hostility between China and the West escalates to a serious breakdown in China-western or China-US relations, manifest for example in a trade war, Russia-level sanctions on China’s economy or a US-China military conflict (proxy or all-out), related for example to Taiwan, then this would pave the way for much closer Russia-China relations.

What would be the consequences for Russia and China?

For Russia, this would probably be the best of the three scenarios, as this would enable much more Chinese support for Russia’s war efforts and ailing economy while also countering Russia’s global isolation and pariah status. Russia has few other powerful friends. Moreover, although Moscow would still be in a junior and dependent position vis-à-vis Beijing, the power balance might be less skewed than currently if China becomes more dependent on its closer ally, Russia.

For China, a much stronger alliance with Russia would have both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, China would be bolstered by its junior ally in its long-term strategic rivalry with the United States, while also providing Beijing with more tools to coerce and pressure Europe. However, the clearer East-West and democracy-autocracy schism manifest in this alliance might strengthen China’s ability to induce or coerce small or middle powers to its side against the West with regard to some states, but weaken it in the case of others. In the long term, it could also be negative for China’s image, influence and manoeuvrability globally, as it becomes tied more closely with pariah state Russia and the “axis of evil”.

On the other hand, a continued “yuanization” of Russia and its foreign trade could serve as both a test for China’s efforts to internationalize the yuan and a signal to other countries globally that, with China’s assistance, it is possible to reduce dependence on or even break away from the western financial system. At the same time, however, Russia’s growing yuan-related problems and dependencies might deter other countries.

Furthermore, for both countries, the much stronger access to each other’s sensitive military technology would facilitate faster technological development and modernization. In this scenario, Beijing would be able to bolster its efforts to achieve parity with the United States.

What would it mean for western policy?

For the West, this scenario would probably be the worst of the three. A stronger Russian-Chinese partnership or even a formal alliance, where Beijing cares much less about maintaining decent relations with the West, would be likely to result in significantly increased Chinese support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, amplifying the autocratic threat to European and to global security. Joint Russian-Chinese technological development and technology sharing would also pose a threat to the West’s military advantage, as well as to its interests in areas such as space, AI and emerging technologies.

This would also signify a consolidation of the global autocratic bloc, posing a threat to western interests and influence across various regions, including the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. This alignment could also embolden other countries in the “axis of evil”, such as Iran and North Korea, especially with support from Russia and China.

On the other hand, it could also lead to – and indeed necessitate – stronger western and Transatlantic unity, resolve and action on how to manage, deter and counter the combined and coordinated long-term revisionist threats from Russia and China in both their respective theatres.

What speaks for or against it?

Several factors support this scenario. The Russian-Chinese strategic alignment against the West and its liberal world order is likely not only to endure but also to grow stronger if the rivalry between China and the West intensifies in the medium to long term. This is especially relevant in the context of the EU decoupling from China, the United States adopting a more hawkish stance (especially a potential Trump administration), China experiencing increased instability and unpredictability due to economic weakening and political tightening, and the world order solidifying around a global democracy-autocracy divide.

Much analysis highlights the period 2027–2030 as China’s timeline for a potential military solution to the issue of Taiwan, based on its military capacity and political narratives. This means that in the medium term, the heightened risk of a military conflict between China and the United States makes the scenario of closer Russia-China relations more likely.

However, several factors argue against this scenario, not least the numerous and significant limitations and challenges in the relationship which are unlikely to disappear or be resolved. Some may even worsen in the medium term as the war and sanctions leave Russia weaker, more isolated and more internationally toxic, while Russian and Chinese goals and means on the global stage diverge increasingly. Moreover, and importantly, a breakdown in relations between China and the West is far from certain as both sides would incur enormous costs from such an outcome.

Conclusions

Multiple possible futures. The ongoing and future development of Russian-Chinese relations is not set in stone. While many current trends point to a continuation of the status quo in the short term, in the medium to long term, other plausible paths can be imagined to either significantly better or worse relations, based on a variety of crucial factors inside, between and beyond the two countries.

Vital consequences for both Russia and China. Despite the growing inequality in Russia-China relations, their future development will have significant consequences for both Moscow and Beijing. For Russia, it might mean the difference between the long-term survival of its economy and the success of its war against Ukraine and Europe, or military, economic or even regime collapse. For China, it will be an important factor in the failure or triumph of its long-term goals of rivalling, surpassing and replacing the United States as the global hegemon and transforming the liberal world order, especially as this is closely connected to the issue of Chinese-western relations.

Differences in scenario preference and viability. However, which scenario is more desirable, given current circumstances and prospects, probably differs between the two countries. While both countries might be comfortable with a continuation of the status quo, Russia might presumably want a significant strengthening of relations. Moscow has few other partners or allies to rely on and the more Chinese political, economic and military support it receives, the better – despite the increased dependence this would cause.

For Beijing, however, which wants to balance relations with both Russia and the West, such a scenario could mean isolation, sanctions and thus large economic, reputational and manoeuvrability costs. Similarly, while a worsening of China-Russia relations would bring negative outcomes for both, China would probably be able to cope with and even find silver linings in such a scenario, whereas for Russia it could be potentially catastrophic.

Differing levels of agency. Russia and China, as well as the West, can affect the future development of Russia-China relations, although to differing degrees. Russia’s options are limited, as it is increasingly reliant on China. How Moscow plays its various remaining cards, however, still matters, including how well it succeeds in boosting various strategic, political, economic and military-technological ties with China; how it fares, and acts, in the war against Ukraine; and how much it can leverage the few things it has that China wants, such as cheap Russian energy, military technology, access to the Arctic and Russian support for Chinese geopolitical ambitions.

China is probably the actor with the most agency in how the relations develop because of Russia’s dependence and because China has options. Thus, to a certain degree, relations will develop as far as China allows them to, which in turn partly depends on how China chooses to and succeeds in balancing and navigating relations with both Russia and the West at the same time.

Policy recommendations for the EU and the West

The West must prepare for a range of potential outcomes in Russia-China relations across domains and their impact on western interests, some favourable and some unfavourable. This entails making difficult but necessary choices regarding resource allocation and strategy development to effectively counter and deter the joint Russia-China threat in both the European and the Indo-Pacific theatres and on the global stage beyond.

Importantly, the policy choices of the West will play a crucial role in the future development of Russia-China ties. Moreover, as shown above, there are worse and better outcomes in the Russia-China relationship for the West. The West should therefore pursue several policy approaches that will be crucial to developing Russia-China ties in an optimal direction and that will be vital for securing western interests regardless of the outcome.

• Accept, face and prepare for a long-term joint Russia-China strategic threat. The deep and growing ties between Moscow and Beijing are strong and enduring – built on a foundation of joint strategic rivalry with the West. This systemic, global and united threat to western security and interests is unlikely to disappear soon, cannot be resolved through grand “deals” or diplomacy and requires western unity and resolve.
• Draw the right parallels between theatres and adversaries. Increasingly, the two theatres of Europe and the Indo-Pacific are interconnected geopolitically for the West in terms of threats, resources and strategies. Just as Russia and China learn from each other in their confrontations with the West, so too must the West draw lessons on the synergies between their malicious behaviour across domains.
• Build capacity to deter and counter both Russia and China simultaneously in both theatres.
  The defence of Taiwan starts in Ukraine, as credible US deterrence and resolve against China is demonstrated by supporting Ukraine’s victory and ensuring Russia’s defeat. Conversely, this dual-theatre capability requires the EU to develop its strategic thinking and culture on deterrence capacity against both adversaries.
• Strengthen Europe’s capacity to take care of Europe. Countering Russia – which is existential for Europe – and China – which is existential for the US – requires that both Europe and the US take primary responsibility for securing their respective theatres. This means Europe becoming serious about its geopolitical agency, not least through massive investments in military and defence-industrial capacity, its competitiveness and technological development, and its long-term capacity to stay united, resolute and independent in the face of Chinese attempts to divide.
• Transatlantic unity on broad fundamentals. Unity and close alignment between the US and Europe on how to jointly frame, manage and counter the Russia-China threat, in both theatres and globally, will be crucial for western interests and security. Countering Beijing and Moscow will require close Transatlantic unity and cooperation in various spheres, such as sanctions, democratic resilience, defence against kinetic and hybrid threats, the defence industry, technological development, alliances and multilateral forums, international outreach and diplomacy, and global issues,.
• Transatlantic dialogue on how to square differences in China policy. At the same time, for various reasons, the US and Europe are unlikely to be completely aligned on China policy in the long term. This need and must not hinder or undermine a coherent Transatlantic strategy vis-à-vis the Russia-China axis. Through dialogue, patience and mutual concessions, both sides need to find ways to work around difficult questions, as well as differences in priorities and threat assessments, regarding trade and political relations with China.
• Differentiate between the two partners where necessary. While their joint threat requires a holistic western approach, Russia and China are different actors with different means and goals, and present different challenges for the West. Russia must be countered and contained wherever and whenever, and holds no value as a potential partner. With China, the West must seek to uphold functioning economic and political relations, not least to resolve global issues.
• Understand where alignment ends and adapt strategies accordingly. Despite growing global alignment, Russia’s and China’s positions, interests and prospects diverge in many regions and on many issues. In the coming years, tracking and understanding the development – and limits – of their alignment will be crucial to properly manage and counter the joint Russian-Chinese threat with differentiated strategies in different spheres.
• Find and exploit differences where possible. Russia and China are too close to be pulled apart through “wedges” or a “reverse-Kissinger”. However, the West can and should leverage the many regions and issues where they are misaligned, including in the Arctic, the Korean Peninsula, Central Asia, Russian nuclear sabre-rattling and violation of international law, and potentially also Ukraine and Taiwan.
• Minimize Beijing’s support to Moscow by maximizing the pain. Western pressure works in affecting Chinese economic behaviour vis-à-vis Russia. Russia-China trade has levelled off in 2024 in response to the pressure from secondary sanctions, as Chinese actors’ reluctance has led to severe problems with payment transactions. The EU must follow the US lead in pressuring both China and other third actors not to enable sanctions evasion by Russia. Credible sanctions enforcement sends strategic signal to China and others.
• Shore up allies both west and east. In both theatres, bolstering allies as much as possible against the threats from Russia and China, respectively, will be crucial to western success and credibility in the global battle against the autocratic axis. In the West this includes Ukraine, NATO’s eastern flank and fledgling western-oriented democracies such as Moldova and Armenia. In the east this includes Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
• Expose and counter the flawed Russia-China offer in the global arena. Beijing and Moscow’s alternative vision for the world finds fertile ground globally due to real grievances, disillusionment with the West, and cheap Chinese loans and Russian hydrocarbons. However, their hollow version of a “multipolar world” – built on contempt for international law – runs counter to the interests of global partners; breeds instability, autocracy and debt traps; and does not provide solutions to global issues such as poverty, inequality and conflict. The West needs to fight Russian-Chinese influence internationally by engaging global partners with diplomacy, clear narratives and real economic involvement.
• Improve relations with key rising and middle powers between east and west. Limiting the global influence and options of the Russia-China axis will require building trust with countries such as India, Turkey, Brazil, Kazakhstan and Indonesia, among others. The West’s strategic engagement with these states will be central for reasons connected to connectivity, transport, supply chains, energy and resources, trade and sanctions, and diplomatic outreach and clout with the developing world. The West should therefore strengthen its cooperation with these countries through “mini-lateralism”, as well as focused and pragmatic partnerships.

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