The end of nuclear arms control?

What has happened?

The official media in Russia and China ritualistically described Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow as “historic.” This time, it is possible they were telling the truth. The talks between Xi and Putin resulted in the adoption of a document that may mark the end of one era in international relations and the beginning of another: the Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability.

In the statement, the two major nuclear powers express concern that the risk of nuclear conflict has increased. As expected, they place all the blame on other nuclear-armed states – primarily the United States, but also the United Kingdom and France. Russia and China accuse them of “destabilising expansion of existing and newly formed military alliances and coalitions close to the frontiers of other nuclear-weapon states,” and of taking “steps to deploy, outside their national territories, ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles with short flight times to a wide range of targets in the territories of other nuclear-weapon states.” At the same time, Moscow and Beijing clearly do not consider the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus – or the promise to station the “Oreshnik” medium-range missile there, capable of reaching any point in Europe – as destabilising.

What is the context?

Russia and China have been particularly harsh in their criticism of US plans to develop a large-scale program dubbed the “Golden (Iron) Dome for America.” This initiative is intended to establish an “unconstrained, global, deeply layered, and multi-domain missile defence system to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from ‘peer and near-peer adversaries.’”

Moscow and Beijing argue that the Golden Dome represents “a complete and ultimate rejection of the recognition of the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms,” which they claim is a central and fundamental principle of maintaining global strategic stability. One might be inclined to agree with this reproach – if the joint statement had referenced international documents that underscore these fundamental principles.

However, it does not. And this omission is no coincidence. The interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms is emphasised in the Moscow–Washington treaties on nuclear arms control and reduction that have been in force for the past half-century. These treaties were the primary instruments of nuclear arms control and, consequently, the main mechanisms for maintaining the balance between nuclear powers and ensuring strategic stability.

What are the policy implications?

Today, all that remains of the once-diverse US-Russian nuclear arms control framework is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which Russia suspended in 2023. The treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2026.

Judging by Foreign Minister Lavrov’s recent interview with Kommersant, Russia has no intention of negotiating a new agreement: “We have our own policy, and we know how to ensure our country’s defence capability, even if the global strategic landscape remains unchanged.” The likely demise of START would mark the definitive end of nuclear arms control as it has existed to date. That is the main challenge to strategic stability today. Yet the joint statement by Russia and China does not even mention the treaty.

Instead, it declares that “the two sides will endeavour to practice true multilateralism and support the central role of the UN and its multilateral disarmament mechanism in the arms control process.” However, it is unlikely that any effective nuclear arms control system comparable to the US-Russian treaties can be established within the UN framework on a multinational basis in the foreseeable future.

To call things by their proper names: Moscow and Beijing have effectively given the green light to an unrestricted nuclear arms race – one that will be accompanied by mutual accusations among the nuclear powers.

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