The NB8–Ukraine security nexus – Shaping Europe’s future defence architecture

Executive summary

The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8)-Ukraine security nexus has the potential to become the operational core of a wider European response to Russia’s long-standing security threat. The Nordic-Baltic countries combined have high levels of political trust in Ukraine, a shared assessment of the Russian threat, advanced defence industries and growing military integration through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). Ukraine’s Defence Forces, which are the world’s most skilled and experienced at Warfare 5.0, possess battle proven doctrine, unmanned systems capabilities across all domains, a combat-validated battle management system, industrial-scale drone production capability and a vast repository of classified AI training data. Ukraine could partner with the NB8 countries through a modular and tailored framework that covers Warfare 5.0 technical solutions, doctrine transfer, training, electronic warfare, counter-drone architecture, and unmanned ground and maritime operations. This cooperation should concentrate on the threats the region already faces. Ukraine and the NB8 should jointly develop layered counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and electronic warfare (EW) architectures for airports, military installations and critical infrastructure; affordable air and missile interceptors; maritime and underwater surveillance and unmanned systems for the Baltic and the North Atlantic; resilient battlefield command and control (C2) and communications under heavy EW; and all-weather intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Ukrainian teams should participate systematically in JEF exercises, capability audits, Red Teaming and regional contingency planning. The forces of NB8 member states should train against Russian tactics reproduced by Ukrainian instructors and operators rather than simulated using peacetime assumptions.

The same logic should shape defence production. Instead of separate national supply chains, Ukraine and its NB8 partners could build distributed production networks with shared standards, licensing arrangements, interchangeable components, reserve stocks and alternative manufacturing sites able to maintain output if facilities are attacked. Existing cooperation with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Latvia provides the foundations for such a model. Joint programmes could connect Ukrainian battlefield validation directly to European procurement and scaling, using the logic already demonstrated by DELTA (Ukraine’s battlefield management and situational awareness ecosystem), Brave1 (Ukraine’s defence innovation and technology acceleration platform) and DOT-Chain Defence (a digital marketplace that directly connects military demand with defence suppliers). At the same time, the NB8-Ukraine framework could become a bridge to the wider European security architecture. Incorporation into European contingency planning, intelligence exchanges, exercises, capability development and emerging command structures should happen now rather than after these structures have been designed. The JEF offers a vehicle for deeper operational integration, while a future European Security Council could provide the political framework for permanent Ukrainian participation. A multinational European unmanned-systems capability built around Ukrainian combat experience and deployable against drone incursions and sabotage would offer an early practical test of this deeper integration. The resulting agenda is concrete: integrate Ukraine into emerging European defence structures; fully leverage the Ukraine-JEF enhanced partnership, which would involve deepening Ukraine’s operational integration into the JEF; build a distributed Ukrainian European production base; establish a European unmanned-systems capability with Ukraine as co-developer; integrate Ukraine into European responses to sabotage, cyberattacks, drone incursions and other sub-threshold operations; create permanent joint cognitive-threat monitoring and exercises; and connect battlefield testing directly to procurement and industrial scaling. These steps would move the relationship from assistance to reciprocal defence integration and make the NB8-Ukraine nexus a working model for a wider European security architecture. Ukraine is not just a recipient of security assistance. Beyond serving as Europe’s frontline against Russian aggression, it now possesses military experience, technologies and operational knowledge that are directly relevant to Europe’s own defence. It is in Europe’s interest to absorb these lessons as quickly as possible. The immediate objective should therefore be to turn existing bilateral agreements and political declarations into operational mechanisms that link defence ministries, armed forces, procurement agencies, intelligence communities and defence companies.

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