Start / Publications / Putin in Uzbekistan, May 26-27, 2024

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On May 26-27, Russian President Vladimir Putin made an official visit to Uzbekistan for bilateral talks with his counterpart, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The visit to Tashkent is Putin’s third official foreign trip since his re-election in March, following his visits to Beijing and Minsk previously in May.

Johan Engvall:

Putin’s two-day state visit to Uzbekistan underscores Russia’s lingering influence in the most populous Central Asian state. This serves as a reminder to Western leaders who have toured the region in recent years, attempting to pull Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan away from Russia.

Russia is a strategic partner to Uzbekistan and wields substantial economic influence over the country. In 2023, Russia was the second largest trade partner of Uzbekistan, behind China, and Uzbekistan’s imports from Russia substantially exceeded its exports. Moscow has also been well-positioned to respond to Tashkent’s desire to attract foreign investments. Finally, access to the Russian labour market has long been critically important for Uzbekistan, with several million Uzbek labour migrants registered in Russia. The local Uzbek economy cannot reabsorb these guest workers.

Given these dependencies, Uzbekistan is in no position to sever ties with Russia. However, this does not mean that Uzbekistan is a Russian pawn. While strong bilateral relations with Moscow are a priority for Tashkent, it rejects Russia’s imperialist agenda. Uzbekistan is neither a part of the Moscow-led military alliance, the CSTO, nor the Eurasian Economic Union, which is designed to promote economic integration on Russian terms. Its foreign policy is based on building positive relations with China, the West and other regional powers, particularly Turkey, which promotes the unity of Turkic states as an alternative to Moscow’s idea of ‘Russkii mir‘ (Russian world) in an attempt to balance Russia’s influence. But against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the question remains whether this approach of neutrality can be successfully maintained over time. 

Hugo von Essen:

Putin’s visit to Tashkent should be viewed against the backdrop of the evolving power dynamics between Russia and China in Central Asia – characterized by a muddy mix of cooperation, competition and rivalry – and its connections to Uzbekistan’s and other Central Asian countries’ geopolitical positioning and foreign policy strategies. The trip follows a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Uzbekistan in January, when the two countries agreed to develop an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era”, the highest level in China’s ‘hierarchy of partnerships’. Like the first China-Central Asia Summit in 2023, this signals Beijing’s shifting approach to the region as it patiently becomes more assertive, threatening Russian influence.

While Russia and China are politically aligned, along with the Central Asian regimes themselves, in their joint aversion to democratic “colour revolutions” and Islamist-fuelled radicalism and instability in the region, Moscow and Beijing also compete for clout and trade. During Russia’s war against Ukraine, Chinese influence has increased while Russian sway has decreased. In both 2021 and 2022, China’s bilateral trade with Uzbekistan (9.06 billion USD in 2022) was slightly lower than Russia’s trade with Uzbekistan (9.39 billion USD in 2022). However, in 2023, China-Uzbekistan trade grew by 51 % (13.72 billion USD) while Russia-Uzbekistan trade only grew by 5 % (9.88 billion USD). This meant that China’s trade with Uzbekistan was 39 % higher than Russia’s, reflecting the situation in the other Central Asian countries as well. In the first months of 2024, China’s lead seems to have held but somewhat diminished.

Crucially, the most significant regional issue uniting Russia and China is their desire to keep the West out. This goal conflicts with the strategies of Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian countries to balance relations with Russia, China and the West, respectively, leveraging them against each other. Moreover, as Russia and China become increasingly strategically aligned, exemplified by Putin’s recent visit to Beijing on 16-17 May, Central Asia’s agency, independence and room for manoeuvre are threatened. In the Russian-Chinese joint statement from the visit, the sides aim to “jointly develop mutually beneficial cooperation” with the region’s countries. Thus, Putin’s visit to Tashkent raises the question of whether Russia can successfully prevent Uzbekistan and its neighbours from navigating away from its reach.

Another question is whether the West, which in the past few years has started to pay more attention and allocate more resources to Central Asia for geopolitical, connectivity and Russia-sanctions-related reasons, will be able to counter an increasingly coordinated Russia-China front.

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