SCEEUS Report No. 8, 2026
Executive summary
After Sergei Shoigu was dismissed as Defence Minister on 12 May 2024, the Kremlin launched an unprecedented campaign of repression against senior officials in the Ministry of Defence. Four deputy ministers have been arrested, as well as heads of the main directorates at the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff and more than ten heads of division or department. All of them face standard charges related to corruption. Some have already been sentenced to long prison terms. Pro-Kremlin commentators claim that Vladimir Putin is attempting to combat corruption, which had reached epic proportions during Shoigu’s tenure since 2012.
The measures could be seen as part of a wider crackdown, in which around 700 high-ranking civilian officials at federal and regional level have been arrested since the February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, such an explanation is hardly satisfactory. Having been in power for over 25 years, Putin understands that corruption is a way of life for both military and civilian officials at the Ministry of Defence under the existing authoritarian regime. There is a complete absence of public oversight, which is at least formally maintained in the civilian sphere, over the activities of the armed forces. In fact, a rejection of any form of such oversight in the military sphere is fundamental to Putin’s regime. Thus, the fight against corruption cannot be the main reason for the purge of the armed forces. Another possible explanation for why repression has been unleashed now is that the Kremlin needs to shift responsibility on to the leadership of the ministry for errors in decision making and for the failure to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine. Putin’s desire to prevent a repeat of the military mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the late owner of the Wagner Group private military company, in June 2023 is the main rationale. Prigozhin blamed corruption in the highest echelons of the military leadership for the military defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces. The arrests of ministry officials are intended to demonstrate to the army that the causes of the shortcomings in the supply of combat troops have been eliminated.
The Kremlin should be concerned about how Prigozhin’s mutiny has affected the mindset of Russian officers. The mutiny is bound to have left at least some Russian officers with the impression that they could use the thousands of armed men under their command for their own interests, rather than merely to carry out the orders of the Russian leadership. The real reason for the crackdown is the Kremlin’s fear of military opposition. Relations between the Kremlin and the Russian military are not as rosy as official propaganda would have everyone believe. The General Staff repeatedly used retired military officers to convey dissent to the highest authorities, and to speak out against the invasion of Ukraine before it began. These fissures could widen in the event of a domestic political crisis. The arrest of senior defence ministry officials is part of a campaign to prevent the army from becoming a political player.
Tensions between Putin and the military are also mounting against the backdrop of an inevitable generational change in the leadership of the armed forces. Repression is being used by the regime to ensure loyalty at the start of this rotation. This is a serious challenge for any authoritarian regime. In the absence of a clear system for renewal, dictators are forced to invent reasons for personnel changes.
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