SCEEUS/NKK Report No. 6
Excecutive summary
- This study explores the shifting power balance between China and Russia since 2022 and its impact on their diplomatic, economic and military relations, as well as on the Arctic and Central Asia. It considers what a weakened Russia might offer China, the benefits China could seek and the implications for their bilateral ties.
- As Russia becomes increasingly dependent on China to sustain its economy, support its war effort, advance technology, counter isolation and uphold anti-western narratives, China is gaining influence over Russia’s economy, politics and society. This leverage might allow China to exert pressure, make demands or seek concessions from Moscow. However, the extent of this shift, China’s willingness to use its leverage and what a weakened Russia can offer vary across domains.
- Economically, China’s leverage could mean deeper discounts on Russian energy exports as sanctions make its oil and gas harder to sell. Moscow might also further promote the “yuanisation” of its economy, supporting China’s push to internationalise its currency. Beijing is likely to seek greater access to Russian markets for its exports and, in the long term, possible involvement in strategic infrastructure projects.
- In the diplomatic domain, China has shown restraint in using its growing leverage, which probably reflects the value both countries place on their strategic partnership and shared goal of challenging the US-led world order. Nonetheless, Russia is offering more explicit support for China’s positions than before, especially concerning its “core interests”. China could seek stronger diplomatic backing from Russia in key international institutions, on NATO or even in regional disputes with India and Vietnam, although China is likely to avoid putting too much pressure on Moscow to protect their strategic ties.
- In defence and military cooperation, China could seek or potentially demand several things from Russia: specific military technologies, sharing of operational experience and intelligence, access to Russian overseas bases and assistance in the event of an escalation related to Taiwan.
- Globally, China could push for greater Russian alignment with its positions and acceptance of Beijing’s interests. In Central Asia, this could mean allowing China to expand its economic and security influence while limiting the role of Russia-led regional organisations.
- In the Arctic, Russia remains a major power with geographic and capability advantages over China. Despite its isolation by other Arctic states, it will continue to wield influence and be capable of offering China substantial opportunities. While Russia is likely to maintain red lines, especially when it comes to the extent of military cooperation, it might have to accept greater Chinese engagement in areas where it was previously reluctant to do so, such as governance, mining and maritime security matters.
- As the power imbalance between China and Russia grows, European policymakers should not make assumptions about the continued stability of the Sino-Russian partnership and instead consider the possibility that tensions could become unmanageable, undermining their political ties, and prepare for the potential consequences of such a development.
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