SCEEUS Guest Report No. 1, 2026
Introduction
Jakob Hedenskog, Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies
The war against Iran, which began on 28 February 2026 with a joint US-Israeli offensive, has significantly increased the strategic importance of the South Caucasus – the region located just north of Iran which comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The war has strengthened the region’s transit potential but also created security risks, economic disruption and inflationary pressures. A continuing conflict could threaten the stability of the entire region, in particular by jeopardising the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and implementation of regional projects.
After six weeks of heavy bombing of Iran, the warring parties entered a fragile ceasefire on 8 April, but negotiations that had begun in Pakistan were suspended after one day. Although US President Donald Trump frequently claims that Iran has been militarily defeated, it is obvious that the broad and partly contradictory military objectives of Washington and Tel Aviv, which span destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and stockpiles of highly enriched uranium to regime change in the Islamic Republic, have not been fully met. Furthermore, the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s fossil fuel needs is transported, has given the regime in Tehran a powerful weapon with which to pressure the outside world.
What immediate effect has the war had on the countries of the South Caucasus? What longer-term impacts would a more protracted war have on security and economies in, as well as mutual relations in the region? These questions are answered in three analyses in this report – one from each country in the region.
From Armenia, Sergei Melkonian of the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI Armenia) notes that the outbreak of war has made diplomatic balancing harder for Armenia, given Yerevan’s good relations with both Tehran and Washington, and its economic reliance on Iran. Further risks for Armenia include disruption of a US-sponsored trade route on Armenian territory and the risks of humanitarian crises linked to an influx of Iranian refugees if the war continues or leads to the collapse of the Islamic Republic.
From the perspective of Azerbaijan, Rusif Huseynov of Topchubashov Center notes that Azerbaijan has already been affected by spillover from the war, when Iranian drones landed in its Nakhchivan exclave in early March. If the war in Iran continues, Azerbaijan, with its large ethnic minority in Iran and its developed military cooperation with Israel, might find itself in an uncomfortable and dangerous geopolitical position. For Baku, like Yerevan, this is not a distant Middle East conflict but a crisis unfolding directly across its southern border, with possible consequences for national security, ethnic politics and the broader balance of power in the South Caucasus.
From Georgia, Teona Zurabashvili and Gia Japaridze, representing the University of Georgia’s Security, Policy & Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN), argue that the war will likely accelerate Tbilisi’s reorientation and greater distancing from the West, and its growing convergence with authoritarian regimes. Iran’s influence in Georgia operates through ideological, religious and social networks, increasing the risk of the radicalisation of certain religious minorities, intelligence penetration and political influence.
Together, these guest commentaries paint a detailed and complex picture of the challenges the three countries in the South Caucasus face as a result of being in Iran’s neighbourhood. It is important to stress that each author is solely responsible for the content of their own text, and the opinions expressed may contradict one another.
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