Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visits China on April 8-9

On April 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Beijing for a two-day visit for discussions with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on Russia’s war against Ukraine, the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, bilateral ties and other “burning subjects” as announced by the Russian side. The visit comes ahead of a rumoured visit by President Putin to China in May. The last time Lavrov visited China was in October 2023, while Putin and President Xi held a phone conversation in February.

The visit comes against a background of recent signs of both strength and weakness in the Russian-Chinese relations. On the one hand, the economic, political and military relations between the two countries are closer than ever. In 2023, total trade turnover reached 240 bn USD, far more – and one year earlier – than the 200 bn USD goal previously set for 2024. Importantly, trade growth is now driven more by increases in Chinese exports to Russia (up 47% in 2023) than by the other way around, which is helping keep the Russian economy afloat and bolstering the Russian defence industry and war efforts. This includes the export of military components, dual-use products such as microchips, vehicles, electronics, chemicals and minerals.

Politically, Beijing and Moscow remain united in their strategic partnership against the US and the West. China is refusing to distance itself from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, instead amplifying major Russian talking points. Militarily, joint exercises are increasing in frequency, size and complexity, the latest being a joint Russian-Chinese-Iranian exercise in March 2024.

On the other hand, Chinese apprehension of the risk of secondary sanctions has seemingly increased significantly due to recent Western efforts to punish and coerce China, including the stark US warning in December 2023 to third countries helping Russia in sanctions circumvention, but also the blacklisting of Chinese companies by the EU in February 2024. Since then, there has been an increasing number of problems reported related to Russian-Chinese payments and Chinese financial institutions unwilling hesitant to work with Russian partners and clients.

This presents a serious challenge for China’s more than two-year-long careful balancing act between supporting Russia and maintaining vital but strained economic and political ties with the West and the US. So far, this navigation has proved difficult and only moderately successful, as Beijing’s pro-Russian “neutrality” has steadily alienated Europe, pushing it towards the US’s more China-hawkish camp.

However, amid the ongoing stabilization of tensions in US-China relations – as exemplified by Xi’s November 2023 visit to the US and the Xi-Biden phone call on April 2 – major Western countries still seem to think that China could play a more constructive role in mitigating the Russian threat to European and global security. Thus, French President Macron visited China in February 2024, and German Chancellor Scholz is due to visit later in April. In the context of a Russia that needs China far more than the other way around, Lavrov’s visit is also a way to compete for Chinese attention.

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