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On 21 May 2024, Moldova signed a Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union (EU) – the first non-EU country to form such an agreement.
What is it about?
The 28-points partnership plan calls for consultation and cooperation in a wide range of sectors. These include countering cyber threats, counterterrorism and preventing/countering violent extremism, capacity building in the security and defence, and strategic communications and countering foreign information manipulations and interference (FIMI). Cooperation also includes border management, non-proliferation and disarmament, and Moldova’s participation in the EU’s Collective Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations.
When meeting in Brussels with Moldova’s Prime Minister Dorin Recean for the signing of the partnership agreement, EU’s High Representative Josep Borrel stressed that the partnership will “jointly address our shared security challenges and further increase Moldova’s resilience” as well as “open new areas of cooperation”.
Prime Minister Recean, for his part, said: “there cannot be any better mechanism to ensure peace and stability for the citizens [of Moldova] than becoming an EU Member State” and until then “the signing of the EU-Moldova Security and Defence Partnership is a step forward, enhancing our peace, security and prosperity”.
The new agreement of enhanced partnership with the EU in defence and security is in line with the objectives set up in the Moldovan National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, which identifies EU accession as one of the key objectives and aims to address transnational challenges. The Strategy was also the first official document in the country which formally declared Russia as a threat to Moldova.
EU support for Moldova
Moldova responded to the Russian full-scale invasion of neighbouring Ukraine in February 2022 by turning sharply towards the West, sending in an EU application in March, and becoming a formal candidate to join the EU in June that same year. In December 2023, the European Council took the historic decision to open accession negotiations with Moldova.
Since February 2022, the EU has supported Moldova with 140 million euro for the modernisation of the Moldovan Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF). One year ago, it also launched the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM), a civilian mission under the CSDP. Moldova has also signed bilateral agreements with EU member states to boost military cooperation, for instance with France in March 2024, in training of the Armed Forces of Moldova.
Increased Russian pressure on Moldova
The increased security cooperations between Moldova and EU comes as Russia recently has stepped up its hybrid war against Moldova. In February 2024, an Assembly in the pro-Russian Moldovan secession region of Transnistria asked the Russian State Duma to “implement measures for defending Transnistria amid increasing pressure from Moldova, given the fact that more than 220,000 Russian citizens reside in Transnistria”. Although Russia left the request largely unnoticed, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in March warned that Moscow will “defend” ethnic Russian population in Moldova and that Chisinau risked “following in the footsteps of the regime in Kyiv”. Further, Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova in May compared Moldova president Maia Sandu’s policies to those of the German Nazi regime – an accusation the Kremlin has labelled against Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
Russia has stepped up its support for Ilan Shor, an exiled Moldovan oligarch, who is sentenced for 15 years in absentia due his involvement in the 2014 bank theft. Shor is believed to be the Kremlin’s main man in Moldova, in buying votes and organising anti-government protests with the objective to achieve a change to a pro-Russian government in the country. In April 2024, Shor organised a congress with representatives of several different pro-Russian political parties in Moldova, creating the Pobeda (Victory) electoral bloc. Russia has also increased its destabilising activities in the Gagauzia autonomic territory in southern Moldova, mainly populated by a Turcic minority. Its leader, Yevgenia Gutsul, who was elected in a contested election in 2023 as nominated for the Shor Party (later banned as “unconstitutional” by the Constitutional Court) travelled during the Spring of 2024 several times to Russia and met with Russian officials, including once with Vladimir Putin.
Looking ahead
The new security and partnership between Moldova and EU, particularly in the areas of cooperation on countering Russian hybrid threats, such as cyber threats and in disinformation, will be very needed for Moldova in the up-coming election season. In conjunction with presidential elections on 20 October 2024 a national referendum on the EU-integration will be held, followed by parliamentary elections in 2025. Especially the referendum whether the country should amend its Constitution to include the Moldova citizens’ wish for EU membership, is a risky project with a very unclear outcome, since the Moldovan population is rather divided over the issue of European integration. This will give Russia multiple possibilities to manipulate the public opinion.
Uncertainty about the prospects for European integration in the region is also increasing with the ongoing developments in Georgia, where the government has turned its back on EU integration. Georgia will hold parliamentary elections the week after the presidential elections in Moldova. Furthermore, in Armenia, where the government has made a recent U-turn in favour of cooperation with the EU, large anti-government protests are going on, and Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine also add to the uncertainty.
Putin in Uzbekistan, May 26-27, 2024